Consultation between the United States and Pakistan after the Soviet Union’s Invasion of Afghanistan

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Abstract: On December 25, 1979, after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan became a frontline country to contain the Soviet Union’s southward expansion. In view of its goals of global containment of the Soviet Union, maintaining stability in the South Asian region, and preventing South Asian countries from swinging to the Soviet Union, the United States actively seeks cooperation of Pakistan to curb USSR expansionism and increase the security costs of invading the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Due to the fact that the amount of the Carter administration’s aid program for Pakistan was far from what the Zia Haq administration wished to get, and the Carter administration had repeatedly suppressed Pakistan due to nuclear issues, coupled with the fact that the United States had not explicitly supported Pakistan in all previous Indo-Pak wars. The combination of multiple factors resulted in the Carter administration not attracting Pakistan to promise cooperation in resisting the Soviet Union.

Keywords: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan; The Carter Administration; The Government of Zia Haq; Reply

Introduction

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one of the major events that occurred in the late 1970s, and it was also an important historical event that led to the end of the Cold War easing period and even the end of the Cold War. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had a huge impact that continues to this day on the countries, regions, and the entire world involved. The consultation and response between the United States and Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were also important distant causes of these issues. At present, the academic community around the world mainly divides the response of the United States and Pakistan to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan into three categories. The first type of research focuses on the response of the United States, while Pakistan, as a frontline country, has less involvement in the cooperation process between the two countries [1]. As Andrew Hartman’s journal paper ‘The Red Template’: U.S. Policy in Society Occupied Afghanistan focuses on the U.S. response [2]. The second type of research is based on Pakistan’s foreign policy and focuses on Pakistan’s response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan [3]. The monograph “Research on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1980-1992” by Professor Zeng Xiangyu reveals the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan during the Afghan War [4]. The third category studies the response of the United States and Pakistan to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but focuses on describing the specific actions of U.S.-Pak cooperation, and briefly mentions the negotiations between the two countries before reaching cooperation [5]. For example, Dennis Kux’s The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, provides a panoramic description of the U.S.-Pak relationship from 1947 to 2000. However, due to the limitations of the writing era, many historical materials have not been declassified at that time. Therefore, there is still room for improvement in the construction of historical materials and details for the United States and Pakistan to respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The first and second types of research both examine and interpret the response to the Afghan war from the perspective of a single country, and mention of U.S.-Pak cooperation only describes the small amount of interaction that occurred when both sides sought anti-Soviet partners externally. The third type of research lacks research on how the Carter administration seeks cooperation from key countries such as Pakistan to resist the Soviet Union. Therefore, the response between the United States and Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1981 requires an explanation of specific changes and obstacles faced. This article is based on the Foreign Relations of the United States and combined with other materials to reveal the U.S.-Pak response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1981.

I The Carter Administration Proactively Improves Attitudes towards Pakistan

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made the Carter administration realize Pakistan’s strategic value, and thus took the initiative to improve its attitude towards Pakistan, emphasizing the importance of seeking Pakistan’s cooperation in resisting the Soviet Union. On December 25, 1979, the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan’s strategic position has skyrocketed due to this [8, P. 272]. The United States’ attitude towards Pakistan has shifted from apathy to enthusiasm, from imposing sanctions to providing assistance. On December 28th, the first day of the Soviet Union’s comprehensive

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occupation of Afghanistan, President Carter, who had always had a cold attitude towards Pakistan, took the initiative to request a phone conversation with President Zia Haq and emphasized Pakistan’s strategic importance [10]. In this call, Carter assured Zia Haq that he was willing to provide assistance to Pakistan in any possible way to punish the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Carter suggested that Pakistan publicly raise the issue of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the United Nations Security Council, propose sending Deputy Secretary of State Christopher to visit Pakistan to discuss cooperation matters, and invite Zia Haq to visit the United States [8, P. 887]. As Dennis Cooks said, the United States’ attitude towards Pakistan “underwent a dramatic change overnight [6, P. 245].”

The Carter administration’s proposal for Christopher’s visit to Pakistan was rejected by the Zia Haq administration, which in turn affected the Carter administration’s use of Pakistan to consume the Soviet Union. On December 29, 1979, Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi pointed out to Arthur Hummel that Pakistan greatly welcomes Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s visit, but this is not the best time because Iran is also very dissatisfied with Soviet behavior. Therefore, Pakistan wants to temporarily suspend contact with the United States to see if the Islamic world can rise up under the leadership of Iran and Pakistan (to fight against the Soviet Union). Christopher’s visit will divert Islamic countries from condemning the Soviet Union, leading them to accuse Pakistan of colluding with the West [7, P. 891]. This statement is not empty talk, but it is not the key reason. The key reason why the Zia Haq administration temporarily disagrees with Christopher’s visit to Pakistan is that it is not yet clear to what extent the Carter administration will provide support. The Zia Haq administration believes that even larger military assistance from the United States is not sufficient to protect Pakistan from potential joint threats from the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and India [7, P. 890]. Agha Shahi strongly demands that the United States not disclose its exchanges with Pakistan on Iran or Afghanistan, believing that such exchanges should be conducted in secrecy [7, P. 891]. In other words, the Zia Haq administration was unwilling to accept Soviet hostility and lose support from Islamic countries due to its engagement with the United States until it received a satisfactory aid commitment from the Carter administration. But the Carter administration was very willing to publicly disclose its support for Pakistan to curb Soviet expansion and show its allies the treatment of standing on the side of the United States. On December 29th, Carter revealed to reporters that he was determined to accelerate the delivery of military supplies to Pakistan [7, P. 893].

II Carter Administration’s Proposed Policy towards Pakistan

After several days of internal consultation, the Carter administration finally decided on a rough outline of its policy towards Pakistan. After multi-party coordination, the Carter administration proposed a draft for aid to Pakistan. On January 4, 1980, the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council held a meeting and approved the aid plan for Pakistan. This plan changes the existing policies of the Carter administration towards Pakistan in various aspects: firstly, the Carter administration intends to lift the legal restrictions on providing assistance to Pakistan, that is, temporarily suspend the sanctions against Pakistan caused by the nuclear issue [11]; Secondly, the National Security Council also seeks to increase the President’s discretion and bypass legal restrictions on Pakistan’s assistance; Finally, the United States intends to reduce Pakistan’s debt on the basis of providing assistance to Pakistan, and seeks help from allies around the world to maintain Pakistan’s national security [7, P. 981].

The Carter administration has engaged in preliminary offline contact with the Zia Haq administration. On January 4, 1980, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Washington, Sultan Khan, met with National Security Affairs Assistant Zbigniew Brzezinski. Sultan Khan emphasized that Pakistan feels isolated and is concerned about how long the United States’ current support for Pakistan could be sustained [7, P. 898]. Brzezinski pointed out that the Soviet Union’s actions should come at a cost, and Afghanistan’s resistance should receive widespread support. Brzezinski assured Sultan Khan that the United States will take action, especially in cooperation with other countries, to meet Pakistan’s security needs. The Carter administration will consult with Congress to reduce obstacles to security assistance to Pakistan [7, P. 899]. On the issue of assisting Afghan’s anti Soviet armed groups, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Sultan Khan, stated that Pakistan’s actions will depend on its perception of the quantity and reliability of U.S. aid. Brzezinski responded by stating that in addition to public statements, the United States is considering military and economic measures. Brzezinski revealed that President Carter will soon announce the initial actions of the United States. Faced with Brzezinski’s promise, Sultan Khan warned that if the U.S. response falls far short of Pakistan’s hopes, it will backfire [7, P. 899]. In other words, the Zia Haq administration was aware of the importance of its strategic value and, after testing the Carter administration’s attitude towards the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, believed that it had a willingness to cooperate. They began to bargain with the United States and attempted to use the Soviet Union as a bargaining chip to force the Carter administration to turn a blind eye to its nuclear issue.

After negotiations between the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington and the Carter administration, the Zia Haq administration believed that there was room for further communication with the Carter administration, and therefore sent Foreign Minister Agha Shahi to visit the United States. Prior to Agha Shahi’s visit to the United States, the Carter administration attempted to finalize the details of the aid package for Pakistan. On January 8, 1980, due to Agha Shahi’s upcoming visit to the United States, the Carter administration intensified internal discussions in an attempt to determine aid to Pakistan in response to certain issues that Agha Shahi may have raised. The internal meeting on January 8th proposed the following plan: Firstly, lift the restrictions of the Symington Amendment. This will enable the United States to provide assistance to Pakistan without being bound by the bill, and can also promote supplementary authorization and
funding for military sales and economic support funds that are currently prohibited under the bill. Carter subsequently approved the proposal to lift the restrictions on Pakistan under the Symington Amendment. But Carter commented on this: “I want to help Pakistan, but I want to maintain an alliance with Pakistan and continue with economic reforms [7, P. 901].” Economic assistance: 1. The plan suggests that the United States use economic support funds as a means of assistance [7, P. 900]. 2. Military assistance. The plan suggests that the level and form of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan should be: (1) demonstrate U.S. political support for Pakistan; (2) Meeting Pakistan’s security needs; (3) The United States will serve as a catalyst for multilateral security efforts, attracting other interested countries (India, China, other Muslim countries, and Western allies) to participate and provide military assistance to Pakistan [7, pp. 907-908] (4) Assistance for the fiscal year 1981. There were many uncertainties regarding aid in the 1981 fiscal year, but the Carter administration needed to indicate to Zia Haq its intention to provide further aid of the same magnitude in the 1981 fiscal year [7, P. 908]. The assistance provided by the United States to Pakistan for the 1981 fiscal year was determined by its decision to make resolute efforts to resist the Soviet Union’s threat to the South Asian subcontinent. At the same time, whether Zia Haq agrees to cooperate in resisting the Soviet Union partly depends on whether the United States and other countries provide long-term support to Pakistan. Both are based on the other party’s efforts as a prerequisite, therefore, it is difficult to achieve this cooperation.

III The Carter Administration Actively Responds to Zia Haq’s Government’s Doubts

Pakistan, relying on its rising strategic position, is attempting to gain the attention of the United States. On January 12, 1980, Agha Shahi visited the United States and held talks with Vance, Brzezinski, and Carter. During the talks, the Carter government actively responded to Zia Haq’s concerns and informed the Zia Haq government of the proposed aid plan for Pakistan. However, the Zia Haq government did not approve this plan. During Agha Shahi’s visit to the United States, senior officials from the Carter administration actively responded to many of the concerns conveyed by him from the Zia Haq government: Firstly, in terms of the effectiveness of the 1959 U.S.-Pak bilateral agreement, the Zia Haq government strongly demanded that the 1959 U.S.-Pak bilateral agreement be upgraded to a formal treaty. The Carter administration’s response was to continuously reaffirm the effectiveness of the 1959 U.S.-Pak bilateral agreement. Secretary Vance reiterated the validity of the 1959 U.S.-Pak bilateral agreement, stating that its legal effect is the same as treaties in U.S. law, emphasizing that the threats Pakistan currently faces meet the conditions of the agreement, and arguing that attempting to transform it into a treaty is futile [7, P. 924]. In the subsequent meeting with Carter, Carter reiterated to Agha Shahi the validity of the 1959 U.S.-Pak bilateral agreement and recognized the Duran Line as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan [7, P. 910].

Secondly, the Zia Haq government tested the Carter administration’s perception of the Soviet Union’s intention to invade Afghanistan, in order to determine the Carter administration’s determination to support Pakistan. The Zia Haq government needs to confirm the Carter administration’s perception of the motives behind the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. If the Carter administration believed that the Soviet Union still had expansionist intentions in South Asia, its determination to support Pakistan would be even more resolute. Vance pointed out to Agha Shahi that the United States believes there is a risk of the Soviet Union continuing to expand into South Asia [7, P. 925]. Brzezinski described the Soviet invasion as a regional issue of profound strategic significance. Brzezinski pointed out that although the United States is not aware of the motives behind the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the impact of this incident is far-reaching. The possibility of political intimidation by the Soviet Union against Pakistan and Iran now outweighs military pressure. Therefore, the United States intends to fulfill the 1959 U.S.-Pak bilateral agreement and fight alongside Pakistan to respond to a possible Soviet invasion of Pakistan. Brzezinski also praised Pakistan for having the courage to resist the Soviet Union [7, P. 911]. Brzezinski pointed out that if the Afghan army invades Pakistan and leads to small-scale conflicts, Pakistan must be able to resist such invasions, push back the invaders, or escalate the war and clearly respond to this obvious act of aggression. Under no circumstances will Pakistan be alone. Brzezinski added, “If the Soviet Union knew that you (Zia Haq) had made up your mind (Military retaliation against the Soviet Union’s adventurous behavior), you (Zia Haq) would be better able to avoid any small-scale conflict along the border.” Agha Shahi asked Brzezinski whether the United States would side with Pakistan if Pakistan’s assistance to Afghan refugees led to Soviet retaliation. Brzezinski replied that if the Soviet Union invaded Pakistan, the United States would engage in war with it [7, P. 915].

Thirdly, in terms of military assistance, Agha Shahi clearly stated that the supply of weapons is crucial for Pakistan to defend its borders. Vance pointed out that weapons provided by the United States should be prioritized for resisting threats from Afghanistan [7, P. 917]. Vance proposed that in a separate military meeting, Pakistan list its weapons and equipment requirements and reach a substantive agreement with the United States on overall priorities. The Carter administration will dispatch a defense team to visit Pakistan for more detailed discussions [7, P. 920]. Brzezinski pointed out, “The military assistance program proposed by U.S. (The Carter administration) is both a symbol of our support and substantive assistance.” We believe this is to establish a more lasting bilateral relationship with Pakistan, including persuading other countries to provide assistance [7, P. 912]. Brzezinski suggests that Agha Shahi should not only focus on the amount of U.S. aid, as the U.S. also needs to persuade other countries to provide aid.

Fourthly, the Carter administration advised Pakistan to temporarily put down its hostility towards India and attempt to unite multiple countries to hedge the potential threat of cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. As for India, the Zia Haq government is concerned about India’s cooperation with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan to establish a
Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis, jointly threatening Pakistan’s national security. Zia Haq demands that the United States enhance Pakistan’s defense capabilities against India [7, P. 914]. Vance pointed out that the United States and Pakistan agree to do everything possible to promote the stability of Indo-Pak relations [7, P. 925]. Carter informed Agha Shahi that the United States plans to send an envoy to India to communicate with Indira Gandhi about the United States’ attitude towards India and inform India of the commitments made by the United States to Pakistan [7, P. 917]. Brzezinski promises that the United States will coordinate with other countries to hedge potential threats from India to Pakistan. Brzezinski also candidly pointed out that Pakistan exaggerates the Indian threat, so the Carter administration refuses to provide Pakistan with more advanced weapons [7, P. 914]. Brzezinski reiterated three suggestions: 1. The United States and Pakistan must ensure a strong bilateral relationship; 2. Pakistan must make it clear that if attacked by the Soviet Union, it will fight against it. The Soviet Union always tried to intimidate other countries, but if they encountered resistance, the Soviet army usually withdrew. Pakistan must respond strongly to the conflict on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan; 3. The United States will attempt to establish a broader cooperation framework with other countries. The United States has strengthened its naval forces in the Indian Ocean. The presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean will continue to increase. Saudi Arabia and Europe will cooperate with the United States [7, P. 914]. The above-mentioned multilateral relations will offset the Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis.

Fifthly, the Carter administration responded to the question of how long Pakistan can sustain the improvement of U.S.- Pak relations. Agha Shahi pointed out that Pakistan hopes the United States to clarify how the resolution of the United States in South Asia will be affected over time, the easing of the situation in South Asia, the reduction of U.S. interests in the region, or the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations [7, P. 912]? Brzezinski explained that in terms of the external situation, the United States’ concern for Pakistan does not stem from or follow changes in U.S.-Soviet relations. The United States has vital interests in South Asia, while the Soviet Union is threatening American interests. This means that the United States needs to maintain good security relations with Pakistan and, if possible, with Iran. If Pakistan can help the United States establish good relations with Iran. The United States would greatly appreciate it. Brzezinski continued to emphasize that if Pakistan were to disintegrate, the vital interests of the United States would be affected [7, P. 913].

Sixth, in terms of economic assistance, the Carter administration requested Congress to provide a total of $400 million in aid funds to Pakistan in the 1980 and 1981 fiscal years, and to divide this $400 million equally between the Economic Support Fund and arms sales credits. The Carter administration is reviewing Pakistan’s most urgent debt relief issue. The U.S. and Pakistan have agreed to hold further economic discussions. Pakistan’s finance minister will visit the United States in the next two weeks to discuss debt relief [7, P. 925]. The Carter administration will have preliminary discussions with its main allies and friends in Pakistan regarding Pakistan’s needs. The Carter administration hopes that U.S. aid will encourage other countries to generously assist Pakistan to meet its needs [7, P. 925]. However, Zia Haq expressed dissatisfaction with the amount of aid provided by the Carter government. Agha Shahi said, “Zia Haq questions the amount of aid provided by the United States (the sincerity of the United States).” Brzezinski said gently, “(Pakistan) needs to consider the following fact: we (Pakistan) have made an impressive start in just two weeks, and compared to the situation when we last talked, we have taken a big step [7, P. 915].”

Seventh, other issues. On the issue of refugees, both the United States and Pakistan believe that there is a need to increase funding assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. On the nuclear issue, the United States Congress and high-level government are strongly and continuously concerned about nuclear non-proliferation [7, P. 913]. The Carter government informed Zia Haq that their aid plan for Pakistan did not receive their approval. On January 17, 1980, Agha Shahi bluntly stated that Pakistan was disappointed with the aid plan proposed by the United States. The $400 million proposed by the United States cannot meet Pakistan’s military needs. This amount is too far from meeting Pakistan’s needs, especially in the context of unresolved debt restructuring issues [7, P. 932]. On January 18th, Zia Haq referred to the $400 million amount proposed by the United States as “a few peanuts” during a conversation with reporters. Zia Haq claims that Pakistan will not exchange national security for 400 million U.S. dollars. This amount of aid will bring more hatred from the Soviet Union [6, P. 250]. The Carter government provided a disappointing amount of aid, which made Pakistan even more disappointed on the basis of unease. In the end, the Carter government’s aid plan to Pakistan was rejected by Pakistan. Carter was forced to send Brzezinski and Christopher to visit Pakistan for further consultations on the aid package.

IV Carter Administration and Zia Haq Government Negotiate Aid Issues
Due to the lack of approval from Pakistan for the aid plan, the Carter government had to raise the price to win cooperation from the Zia Haq government. On February 2-3, 1980, Brzezinski and Christopher visited Pakistan, hoping that Zia Haq would receive an aid package. In this meeting, Christopher promised on the economic front that while the United States provides economic assistance, it also requires the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan to increase their aid to Pakistan. The United States will provide $200 million in aid to Pakistan in the next year and a half. At the same time, the PL-480 aid funds for fiscal years 1980 and 1981 increased by $60 million on the original basis, and funded one-third of the work of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In terms of Pakistan’s debt, Christopher told Zia Haq that the United States intends to reschedule repayment with other creditor countries in Pakistan [7, P. 965]. The total amount of economic aid considered by the United States is close to $300 million. Christopher pointed out, “This kind of aid (from the United States) should not be measured in currency.” Its value far exceeds the dollar value provided by the United States [7, P. 961]. In Christopher’s
view, although the current amount of economic aid is not very attractive, it is only a part of the U.S. aid plan. The United States will also persuade allies to assist Pakistan. In terms of military sales, the United States pointed out its efforts to Pakistan. Christopher pointed out that this time the United States is providing military sales to Pakistan, which has violated its 15 year military sales credit policy. Christopher pointed out that $200 million in arms sales aid is only the first step. On February 1st, President Carter approved special military sales terms for Pakistan, which extended the repayment term of Pakistan’s military sales financing loans by 10-20 years in fiscal years 1980 and 1981 [7, P. 961]. Christopher threatened Zia Haq that Pakistan needs to immediately agree to the aid program proposed by the United States, or the aid will be delayed for one year.

In terms of rescheduling debt, Christopher pointed out that the United States is prepared to be more flexible in debt, discussing not only upcoming debts but also future debt arrangements. The United States also requires other countries to provide grants and other assistance to Pakistan [7, P. 961]. In terms of Pakistan’s national security, Brzezinski pointed out that President Carter attaches great importance to the threats facing Pakistan and equates its status with the Persian Gulf, emphasizing that the United States will fulfill its obligations under the 1959 U.S.-Pak bilateral agreement. The United States also proactively mentioned conducting joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean in response to Soviet threats [7, P. 961].

The Zia Haq government is very dissatisfied with the Carter government’s aid plan and has raised its own demands. Zia Haq raised Pakistan’s own demands after Brzezinski and others completed their presentation of the U.S. aid plan. Zia Haq summarized Pakistan’s demands into three aspects: security, economy, and military [7, P. 963]. In terms of security, Zia Haq emphasized that the 1959 bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan not only addressed the threat posed by the Soviet Union, but also the enemy of the country assisted by the Soviet Union (India). Zia Haq pointed out that Pakistan expects the United States to effectively implement the 1959 U.S.-Pak bilateral agreement, and if necessary, the United States needs to send troops to respond to the Indian threat. Zia Haq admitted to Brzezinski that he was aware that relevant U.S. laws restrict U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, so Pakistan only hopes to seek economic assistance from the US. In terms of economic assistance, Zia Haq has always emphasized to the United States that Pakistan needs more economic assistance and rearranges its debt. Zia Haq rejected the economic aid package proposed by the Carter administration, as the amount of U.S. aid not only represents the importance that the U.S. places on Pakistan, but also affects the degree to which other countries attach importance to Pakistan. If one accepts the amount of aid from the United States, it is impossible to explain it to the domestic people. Zia Haq mocks that the $200 million in U.S. aid is only enough for Pakistan to purchase 12 Phantom fighter jets. At this meeting, Zia Haq proposed a five-year economic aid list to Brzezinski, which requires $1-1.5 billion annually. Zia Haq stated that only when the aid meets this standard can the United States and Pakistan engage in cooperation; the types of aid Pakistan needs are very flexible, with Commodity Program Lending and Debt Rescheduling being the most urgent [7, P. 963]. After careful discussions on the details of the aid plan between the two sides, Zia Haq learned that the amount of U.S. aid has only slightly increased, from $400 million to $500 million. Zia Haq was deeply disappointed and complained that the United States always did too little and came too late, calling $400 million a shame on the United States [7, P. 971]. Zia Haq has repeatedly expressed that it is not a matter of how much aid is provided, and repeatedly reminded the United States to refer to the 1959 U.S.-Pak Bilateral Cooperation Agreement, implying that the United States has failed to fulfill its obligations under this agreement. Zia Haq never forgot the Carter administration’s cold attitude towards him in the past, and still has some complaints to this day. Zia Haq stated that she had written a letter to President Carter on May 9, 1978 regarding the issue of Soviet manipulation of Afghanistan, and now (February 2, 1980) he is pleased to see that the Carter administration agrees with his views [7, P. 970]. On February 2nd, after meeting with Zia Haq, Brzezinski and Christopher concluded that the main reason Pakistan did not accept the proposed economic and military aid plan from the United States was because it believed that the amount of aid was too small [7, P. 976].

V The Carter administration prevents the downward trend of U.S.-Pak relations

The Carter administration failed to win Pakistan’s Support. And U.S.-Pak relations gradually declined. In early April 1980, Hammer, who was aware of the gradual decline in U.S.-Pak relations, suggested to the Carter administration to take measures to prevent the deterioration of U.S.-Pak relations. Ambassador Hammer believes that the United States must now take action to prevent the deterioration of U.S.-Pak relations and strive to meet the achievable parts of Pakistan’s demands [7, P. 992]. On April 17th, Zia Haq pointed out that the United States should have played a more important role in retaliating against the Soviet Union, but unfortunately, the United States did not do so. Practical steps are more important than pure statements [7, P. 998].

Against the backdrop of the gradual decline in U.S.-Pak relations, the Carter administration is showing goodwill to the Zia Haq administration. On April 30th, Carter wrote a letter to Zia Haq expressing his desire to continue secret cooperation with Pakistan against the Soviet Union [7, P. 1004]. The United States has taken the initiative to assist Pakistan in debt restructuring in order to show goodwill to it. On June 2nd, Secretary of State Edmund Sixtus Muskie proposed to Carter to strengthen U.S.-Pak relations, specifically to address Pakistan’s primary concern: rescheduling debt repayment dates. Musky also pointed out that the United States needs to clarify to Pakistan its pursuit of strengthening national policies in South Asia to curb Soviet adventurism. Carter ultimately approved Musky’s proposal to participate in multilateral negotiations on debt rescheduling [7, P. 1006]. On June 3rd, Ambassador Hammer issued a final appeal to the State
Department to provide Pakistan with the economic support it needs to avoid harming U.S. interests in South Asia. If the United States does not provide Pakistan with the economic assistance it requests, it should also urge other countries to provide economic support to Pakistan, otherwise the U.S.-Pak relationship will deteriorate sharply. On the same day, [7, P. 1009]Brzezinski pointed out that the U.S. economic aid plan for Pakistan will be discussed publicly for the first time at the aid consortium meeting held in Paris on June 12th.

Despite the goodwill shown by the Carter government on the debt issue, the Zia Haq government continues to express dissatisfaction with the aid amount to the Carter government. On June 3, 1980, Zia Haq emphasized to the Carter administration the necessity for Afghan “freedom fighters” to acquire modern weapons: (If they do not obtain modern weapons, Afghan freedom fighters) will collapse within 4-5 months. Zia Haq pointed out that although Pakistan is willing to provide military assistance to the Afghan resistance organization, it needs the United States to provide security guarantees. The current $200 million military aid proposed by the United States cannot meet Pakistan’s security needs. If the level of assistance provided by the United States to the Afghan resistance organization is comparable to that provided by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan, Pakistan is willing to risk being attacked by the Soviet Union to provide necessary support to the Afghan resistance organization. Zia Haq expressed her desire to improve relations with the United States, and also hoped that the United States would increase its military budget to aid Pakistan in resisting the Soviet Union, and reaffirm Pakistan’s important position in the international community [7, P. 1010].

VI The Carter administration failed to win the Zia Haq government’s joint resistance against the Soviet Union
The Carter government’s aid plan ultimately failed to receive approval from the Zia Haq government. The Zia Haq government tested the United States’ determination to support itself after rejecting $400 million aid plan from the United States. In early June 1980, Pakistan asked if the United States could provide some weapons for its own use in border areas near Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Turner believes that Pakistan’s move is intended to test whether the United States is seriously supporting itself [7, P. 1016].
The U.S. and Pakistan continue to carry out secret activity plans in Afghanistan. At the end of June, the United States believed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was only aimed at establishing a regime similar to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, with no plans to further expand its sphere of influence [7, P. 1017]. At this time, Pakistan expressed its willingness to expand its covert operations in Afghanistan to the United States in order to prevent its strategic position from declining. Saudi Arabia is willing to sponsor funds to support the plan. On June 30, 1980, CIA Director Stansfield Turner proposed to President Carter to increase the funding for covert operations in Afghanistan from the previous $30 million to $50 million. Pakistan is concerned that the Soviet Union is retaliating against its support for Afghan militants and is seeking some weapons from the United States. The CIA suggests providing Soviet style weapons to Pakistan, whether directly provided by the United States or through other countries. The CIA suggests providing Pakistan with approximately 100 Soviet SA-7 missiles and 20 launch vehicles, 100 Soviet RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launcher vehicles, and appropriate ammunition; 2. Provide Pakistan with foreign manufactured weapons with similar functions without Soviet style weapons; 3. Provide Pakistan with American style weapons with functions similar to SA-7 and RPG-7, as both Soviet and foreign weapons are unavailable [7, P. 1021]. Pakistan is unwilling to publicly purchase these weapons and hopes to purchase them through secret channels. It also specifically points out the importance of confidentiality to the United States. Saudi Arabia has expressed willingness to provide half of the funds required to purchase these weapons [7, P. 1022]. President Carter ultimately approved the continued expansion of covert operations in Afghanistan on July 8th [7, P. 1027]. The Zia Haq government understands that if the United States provides military assistance to it, it will inevitably trigger congressional inquiries, and Pakistan’s nuclear issue will once again be brought to the public stage, ultimately preventing the United States from providing military assistance to Pakistan [7, P. 1039]. After Pakistan rejected the Carter government’s aid plan, U.S.-Pak relations gradually declined, [7, P. 1040-1052]. On the occasion of Zia Haq’s upcoming visit to the United States, the U.S. Department of Defense and the National Security Council have suggested selling symbolic F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. On October 3rd, after Zia Haq attended the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Carter invited him to the White House as a guest. The two discussed the issue of Afghanistan during the meeting. Zia Haq believed that Republican presidential candidate Reagan would win the election, so she decided not to proactively mention military aid in his talks with Carter. Because if Carter wins, his previous promises will continue to exist. If Reagan wins, any suggestions Carter makes will be meaningless [6, P. 254]. Until the end of the talks, Zia Haq did not mention the issue of military assistance. Carter had to take the initiative to raise this question. Carter informed Zia Haq that he is willing to provide Pakistan with a package of military assistance, including the F-16. Zia Haq said, “This issue can wait a bit longer because you (Carter) are undoubtedly busy with the presidential election” [9].” The Carter government’s aid plan ultimately did not receive approval from the Zia Haq government. The Carter administration failed to reach cooperation with Pakistan on anti-Soviet matters.

Conclusion
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, Pakistan’s strategic position significantly increased. The Carter administration changed its previous cold attitude towards Pakistan and immediately began planning aid to Pakistan. Although the Pakistan nuclear issue still exists, it can no longer affect the Carter administration’s adjustment of its policy towards Pakistan. At this time, the Carter government was deeply concerned about dealing with the Pakistan nuclear issue
and failed to meet the requirements of the Zia Haq government. The Carter administration told the scale and quantity of aid to Pakistan in order to strive for cooperation in resisting the Soviet Union. However, the Zia Haq government is dissatisfied with the amount of U.S. aid to Pakistan, and in view of the painful lessons of U.S. betrayal of Pakistan in the past, they do not agree with the aid plan proposed by the Carter government, and jokingly call the Carter government’s aid a few peanuts. Afterwards, the Carter administration’s aid to Pakistan did not increase on a large scale lead to Pakistan’s refusal, so it was unable to persuade Pakistan to engage in resisting the Soviet cooperation. The Carter government has repeatedly negotiated with the Zia Haq government, but has not achieved any constructive results. During the Carter administration’s term, due to the Carter administration’s failure to meet the Zia Haq government’s aid requirements, the United States and Pakistan did not achieve large-scale cooperation to resist the Soviet Union.

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